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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
GLORIA G. FENTON, 
Plaintiff and Respondent 
vs. 
CEDAR LUMBER & HARD~WARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defen~ant and A ppella;n,t 
Case No. 10238 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a quiet title action by the Plaintiff-Respon-
dent to quiet the title to certain property in Cedar City, 
Utah.· The Defendant-Appellant filed a Cross Complaint 
to quiet title to the same property in the defendant. 
' DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The lower court found the issues for the plaintiff 
and rendered a Decree quieting title to the disputed 
property in the plaintiff-respondent. There was no trial 
in the lower court and instead the case was submitted 
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2 
to the court upon the .pleadings,. a~ exhibit consisting 
of an abstract of title to the property and a stipula-
tion of facts entered into by counsel. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON._APPEAL 
The defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the 
judgment of the lo\ver court and directing the lower 
court to enter a Decree quieting· title to the disputed 
property in the defendant. 
ST~L\_TE1IENT OF FACTS 
This case was never tried but was submitted to the 
•' . . 
lower court on the pleadings, an abstract of title to the 
disputed property, written interrogatories and answers 
thereto, and a stipulation of facts entered into by coun-
seL ~rhe facts are that prior to 1942 one Kate Wallace 
was the o·w·ner of approximately 5.9 acres of land in 
Cedar City, Utah, including the disputed property. In 
1942 Kate .wallace conveyed to one Alice Srnith, a pre-
decessor in interest of the plaintiff, part of the plain-
tiff's property and in 1943 conveyed the remainder also 
to a predecessor in ti tie of the plaintiff. . Tpese deeds 
from !{ate Wallace commenced at the northeast corner 
of the tracts conveyed arid then· ran west to ''a public 
road as platted on .Plat" A of the plat of said property 
and·adjoining· property made by Theron Ashcroft, thence 
south along said east ·line of ·said road . . . '' In 1946 
and. again in November of 1950 correction deeds were 
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executed by Kate Wallace of the same property to the 
same grantees for the reason that the 1942 and 1943 
deeds had a wrong starting place a:nd were therefore 
erroneous. The 1.942 and 1943 deeds are shown at pages 
27 and 28 of the abstract of title and the correction 
deed of November, 1950, is shown at page 38 of the 
abstract. It is clear, however, that these later deeds 
were only correction deeds of the same property. 
In July of 1944 this same Kate vVallace conveyed 
all of the remainder of her 5.9 acre~, except the ''street'' 
area hereinafter referred to, to predecessors in interest 
of the defendant so that at that date, of the original 
tract of 5.9 acres, Kate Wallace only retained one tract 
of land, 66 feet wide and 150 feet deep, the east two 
rods of which is the property in dispute. On March 15, 
1950, Kate Wallace conveyed this last 66 feet by·150 feet 
tract by Warranty Deed to Cedar City, a Municipal 
Corporation. Right after the description of the tract 
is the clause, "the ~above property ris to be used for. 
street and no other purpose.'' (Italics added). 
Cedar City did not open up this property as a pub-
lic street, however, and ·in fact it has never been opened 
or used as a public street, never has been a part of the 
Cedar City street system and has never appeared on 
any map or plat as a street. In fact it had never been 
a street prior to the March 15, 1950 deed to Cedar City 
from Kate Wallace and was never a public road as was 
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referr~d ·to in the Kate· Wallace deeds to plaintiff's· 
predecessors in 1942, 1943 and again in November of 
1950. In fact there is no Plat A by Theron Ashcroft 
or anyo~e else. Therefore., we have a situation of both 
the public road and plat ref erred to in the deeds to 
pllijntiff 's predecessors as actually never existing. In-
stead, the property conveyed to Cedar City as a street 
and also the property on the east of the street conveyed 
to plaintiff's predeGessors and also that on the west of 
the . street conveyed to defendant's predecessors re-
mained unimproved farming property having a potential 
value as residential property, which in fact it now is. 
As early as August 14, 1951, it became somewhat ob-
vious that Cedar City was not going to open up a street 
at the prop~rty because on that date, Kate Wallace quit-
claimed this same 66 feet by 150 feet tract to the de-
fendant. Right after the description of the property is 
the .clause : 
"It is tb~ intention of the grantor to convey 
all right, title and interest which grantor may own 
in the above property, heretofore conveyed to 
Cedar City Corporation for a street, in the event 
Cedar City Corporation vacates said street." 
In Jan nary of 1952 Cedar City accepted from the 
defendant a subdivision of all.the property they ~ad ac-
quired from Kate Wallace lying south and west of the 
''street'' property kno'vn as the ''Valley Circle Subdi-
yision,'' which subdivision did not make use of the street 
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IJroperty previously conv-eyed to Cedar ·city but inst~ad 
had other streets to serve the subdivision. 
The street property, consisting ot a tract 66 feet 
wide and 150 feet long, remained unopened and unused 
as a street for approximately ten years. -.In 1960 Cedar 
City passed an ordinance closing and vacating the 
''street'' even though it had never been opened and 
used as a street. No person, including the parties or 
their predecessors, objected to· the closing and all parties 
concerned have proceeded on the theory that the street 
is now effectively closed. No public or private ease-
ment in a· street is asserted or claimed and the only 
question now to be decided is, ''who owns this 'street' 
property, the Plaintiff-Respondent, who is the abutting 
o'vner on one side, or the Defendant-Appellant, who 
acquired the. street property from the former owner?'' 
The west two rods of the street property is not in dis-
pute and is owned by the appellant and 
1
We are only 
concerned with the east t1vo rods or the half of the 
. '' 
street adjoining the property of the plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
WHEN A PUBLIC STREET IS VACATED, THE LAND THAT 
WAS STREET REVERTS TO THE OWNER OF THE FEE 
IN THE STREET AND NOT TO ABUTTING LAND OWNER 
UNLESS HE ALSO OWNS THE FEE IN THE STREET. 
At the outset, it should be stated that throughout 
this brief the 'vords ''street,'' ''closing and vacating the 
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street,'' ''abutting upon the street,'' and other like ref-
erences to a street are used. However, a street actually 
never" existed, either physically on the ground or by 
map or plat, and therefore these words are used advis-
edly. · Even though this brief is concerned with the own-
ership of the street property, . conveyances of property 
with- reference· to or abutting upon the street and other 
like principles, actually none of these principles of law 
is applicable as . a street really never has existed. How-
ever, it is felt that the Court, in the last analysis, will 
want to decide this case on its merits and this brief is 
written much as it would have been had there actually 
bHen a s~reet.. But by so doing, the appellant is not con-
ceding that there was a street and it is not abandoning 
i,ts· claim that we are here concerned only with the own-
ership of a tract of la:nd of building- lot size. and the 
law pe-rtaining to streets and_ the ownership of land in 
the street has nothing to do with the case. 
The plaintiff has presented this case on the theory 
that whenever a City vacat~s a public street, the land 
which was street automatically becomes the property of 
the abutting land owner; that by the act of simply vacat-
ing the street, the abutting owner, ipso facto, became the 
0"\Vner of. the street and that this is SO even' though there 
really had never been ·a street~· This theory , is made 
clear in the Answers to Interrogatories, stipulation of 
facts and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
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entered in this case. The defendant submitted to the 
plaintiff written interrogatories, one of which asked the 
plaintiff to set forth the nat~~e of her claim to the street. 
The plaintiff ans_wered in_ her answer to Interrogatory 
No. 3 that ''the entire claim of the plaintiff to the two 
rods ... is based upon acquiring a deed from plaintiff's 
immediate. predecessor in interest who was the owner 
of the property to the east of the t~o rods in question 
at such time as Cedar City Corporation abandoned same 
for a street and the entire claim of the plaintiff is based 
upon succeeding to whatever interest this person had, 
and is based entirely upon the rights of an adjoining 
property owner to land held for a street at such time 
as the public body abandons said street or road.'' Like-
wise this claim is set forth in the stipulation of facts 
submitted to the. court wherein the.: stipulation states 
that the ''claim of the plaintiff to the land in question 
is based upon her being a successor in interest to the 
parties who owned the property immediately to the east 
of said street at the time of said vacation of said street 
by Cedar City." In the court's- Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law the plaintiff's theory 1s approved 
as Finding No. 17 provides as follows : 
''The plaintiff's predecessors in title and in-
terest, o'vning and holding the property abutting 
the said street on the east side thereof at the time 
it was vacated by Cedar City approximately ten 
years after being received by Cedar City, had the 
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. ,. east side. of ~aid street. revert and revest in them-
1 " se ves . . . . 
But- the ·city, by: merely closing a street; creates no 
legal rights in .the street, but only -relieves the land of 
a·burden. It is not the law now and never has been that 
a city, -by vacating a street, creates any property rights 
in. th~ abutting land owner or for that matter in the 
original land owner. It is the law as established almost 
\ 
unaniinotisly·;by the case~ that upon the closing of a 
street, the land ~vhich was. a streei- goes to the owner of 
the fee ·in- the street. ·The plaintiff has entirely missed 
the crux of this case by not making an effort to show 
that she also owns the -fee in th"e street or at least the 
east two ·rods· thereof. It should be noted that at no 
time has -~the 'plaintiff claimed to be the owner of the 
fee to ha1f the street, but only th:at she was the owner 
of th~e abutting property and 'th-e Court has found that 
the plaintiff was- the owner of the abutting property and 
·in fact tliis ·has never· beGn questioneJ. But the Courlf 
did not find that the plaintiff was the o-u,ner of the .fee 
to half the street.- The plaintiff has ignored this com-
plete~y and has presented this case on the theory that 
the closing of the street by the City places the fee to the 
east· half of the street in the plaintiff. But the closing 
oi the street has nothing to .. do "'ith where the fe~ _is, 
but instead it __ 'is the conveyances ·by the own~rs of the 
property which ,determines \Vh~re the fee is and from 
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them, it· could only be with.- -the defendant.- 'The law 
which holds that upon closing of a street, the .land goes 
to the owner of. the fee· is set forth in 25 Am. Jur., ·page-
424, as follows : 
"Rights with respect to the reversion of title 
upon the abandonment or vacation of a highway 
depend, in the absence of st~tutory provision, upon 
the ownership of the fee. The general rule is to 
the effect that where the absolute and unqualified 
fee is in the municipality or other public agency, 
it divests the original owner of his entire interest, 
so that upon-: .. -dis~ontin~ance of the way as.: such, 
the title does not revert to the grantor .or the 
abutting owner, but remains in the municipality or 
other agen~y unaffected by the vacation. ·where 
a mere easement of use as a public highway is 
taken or granted so that the fee of the soil re-
mains in the original own~r, the vacation or dis-
continuance of the highway as such restores ex-
clusive possession thereof to such owner, or his 
successor· or assigns.'' 
A number of Utah cases follow the above· rule, not-
ably Knioht vs. '11hornas, 101 Pac. 3'83, · 35 [Jtah 470, 
which held that ''when the street is vacated, the right 
to occupy and use the land belongs· to . him in. who the 
fee -is-the City, or the original land owner if it was re-
served by him and not conveyed~ or to t~e abutting prop-
erty owner and the land is subject to all the use·. and en-
joyment ·and burdens of other lands.'' 
. ' 
Therefore, it was error for the lower court to 'find · 
and rule that ·upon th({ vacating of a public· street, the 
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street automatically. goes to the abutting property own-· 
er. It is admitted, that if the. abutting property owner 
also happened to own the fee in the street, then such 
'vould be the case but not other~wise. As hereinafter 
pointed out, the abutting propertY. owner could not have 
be~.n the owner , of the fee and . therefore, it was error 
for the court to grant to the abutting owner the title to 
half the .street. 
POINT II 
A CITY ORDINANCE VACATING A STREET CAN PASS 
.NO TITLE TO THE FEE IN. THE STREET. 
It should be noted· that the lower court has taken 
the. position that all that is necessary in order to suc-
ceed .to the property that once was street is to be an 
abutting property owner upon the vacating of the street. 
Findings of Fact No. 17 so provides. But this finding 
or no other finding by the court ;was to the effect that 
the abutting owner also o'vned the. fee in the street and 
in fact the Findings and the claims of the plaintiff are 
silent. on this important fact. To merely find that the 
plaintiff or her predecessors, was the owner of the abut-
ting property on the east at the time the street was va-
cated _means. nothing. -In order to entitle the plaintiff 
to the street or the east half of it, the court must of ne-
cessity also find that this abutting owner also owned 
the fee to the half of the . street now claimed. 
It is obvious froiD. the Findings and Conclusions 
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that the lower court decided this case on the theory that 
(1) when Kate Wallace conveyed the street property to 
Cedar City in March of 1950, she parted with all her 
ownership and title; Finding No. 16 so provides; ( 2) that 
since she had parted with her property, her deed of 
August, 1951, of the same property to the defendant was 
a .nullity and conveyed nothing as Finding 'No. 16 also 
so provides ; ( 3) therefore, Cedar City held title to the 
property and ( 4) by enacting the vacating ordinance in 
1960, the street property automatically ''reverted and 
vested'' in the abuttin,g property owner. But this en-
tire theory is fallacious and untenable. In the first 
place, how can Kate Wallace's deed of Ma!.ch 15, 1950, 
be said to divest her of all interest in the property~ It 
is clear that she conveyed only an easement or_ some 
other limited estate or interest, else why did she attach 
the clause ''the above property is to be used_ for street 
and no other purpose"? __ What if Kate Wallace had in-
stead put_ in her deed ''only an easement for a public 
street over the above prop~rty is hereby conveyed and 
if Cedar City never opens up a street, o~ if opened and 
later vacated, the property shall revert to the grantor'' 1 
Could it then be said that Kate Vvallace parted with all 
her interest in the property? But as a pra-ctical matter, 
does not her language say the same thing? After the 
City received this deed in 1950, could the city have used 
this property for a park, a public building or some other. 
purpose? The City most certainly could have- done if 
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it had received the full interest 1n the property. Or 
suppose Kate Wallace had more clearly set out her 
restriction on future use of the property and then the 
·City passed an ordinance vacating the street and in .ad-
dition conveyed the street property to the abutting o'vn-
er .. Would this owner have gotten the title~ Clearly 
the abutting owner would not have as this would be 
entirely contrary to the expressed intent of the original 
g·1•antor ·which· would be to ·reserve in herself the fee. 
Furthermore, if Kate vVallace did part with the full 
interest in the property as the court has so found, then 
how could the act of adopting an ordinance closing the 
street pass any· title to the abutting owner~ An ordi-
nance cannot serve as an instrument of conveyance. If 
the City actually got the full interest in the street prop-
erty, or owned the fee, then after closing the street by 
ordinance, the· City would own the street and would 
have to· convey the property to the abutting owner by 
deed. The Utah case of Knight rs. Thomas, supra, es-
tablishes this. But there is no such conveyance here and 
none is claimed. 
It should be perfectly clear to anyone that when 
Kate Wallace conveyed the land in question to Cedar 
City but then put in her deed the clause, "the above 
property to be used . for street and no other purpose,'' 
she was only ··conveying a public easement and was re-
serving_ to herself the fee. This is the only possible 
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interpretation that can be. put upon these words.· If 
there is any possible doubt as to. the intention of Kate 
Wallace, this should be dispelled . by her deed only a 
year and a half later of the. same ·property to ·the 
defendant, ~which deed carried the clause ~'It is the ·in-_ 
tention of the grantor to convey all right, title and in-
terest which grantor may own in the above property, 
heretofore conveyed to Cedar_ -City Corporation for a 
street, in the event Cedar City Corporation vacatef? said 
street.'' This is page 39 of the abstract of title .. 
The case of Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, 102 Pac. 
7 40, 36 Utah 257, is a leading case on this subject, and 
shows that a land O"\\~er, in granting to a city or 
other public body, land for a street, may reserve the 
fee. In that case it was held that a "grantor in grant-
ing an easement may restrict his conveyance by apt 
words to the precise parcel of land intended to be con-
veyed and he may reserve to himself the title to that 
portion of the land within the street subject to the pub-
lic easement and if it appears that such "\\7 aS the inten-
tion of the parties, the intentjon will prevail and the 
land in the street, in case it is vacatefl, will revert to 
the grantor and not to the a hutting owner.'' . 
As stated previously the lower court's theory of 
this case is that Cedar (;ity held the full title to the 
street property and that by adopting the closing ordi-
nance the fee automatically reverted and vested in the 
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abutting o'vner without any further conveyance. But as 
shown above, upon closing the street, the property would 
go to the owner of the fee and yet the plaintiff has made 
no -effort to show that she also O:\\rned the fee in the 
street and the Findings do not state that the plaintiff 
also owned the fee and thus the Findings are clearly in-
sufficient to support the Decree. It is submitted that 
this is the glaring error in this case. 
POINT II~ 
THE RULE THAT A CONVEYANCE OF LAND ABUTTING 
UPON A STREET ALSO CONVEYS TO THE CENTER OF 
THE STREET HAS NO APPLICATION WHEHE THERE IS 
NO STREETt EITHER OPEN AND IN USE OR EXISTING 
BY MAP OR PLAT. 
It ~hould be noted from the abstract of title sub-
mitted that none of the conveyances to the plaintiff's 
predecessors ever expressly convey the street property. 
In fact the west line of the property conveyed is the 
east line of the ''street.'' Therefore, how can the plain-
tiff claim any title to the street property~ It is sub-
mitted that the only possible claim to the street prop-
erty is by the application of a doctrine of law completely 
ignored by the plaintiff, '""hich is that a conveyance of 
land abutting upon a street or hig·hway actually conveys 
to the. center of the street or highway providing the 
grantor owns the fee in the street and providing no 
contrary intention is sho;wn. Although this· theory was 
not raised or relied upon below, the appellant is placed 
·in. a position where it may .l>e necessary to· refute it. 
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blince, ·it is. clearly. not ap-plicable 1n this case anyway; 
the undersigned begs the indulgence of -the, C-ourt to 
point out why it is. not applicable~; ·in the event it is· 
attempted to be relied. upon in this appeal by the· ·Re-
spondent. 
It is the common law rule tha:t a conveyance of land· 
abutting upon a street also carries to- the. center of the 
street. It is based upon a presumption and its applica-
tion carries actually more property than is described in 
the deed. Utah has enacted this common law rule ·by 
statute, being Section 27.;.1-7, Utah C·ode, which is as fol-
lows~ 
"By taking or accepting land for· a highway 
the public acquires only the right of 'vay and inci-
dents necessary to enjoying and maintaining it. 
A transfer of land bounded by a highway passes 
the title of the person whose estate is transferred 
to the middle of the highway." 
Th~ above section "\Vas actually repealed by the Leg-
islature _in 1963 and a new section, 27-12-101 substituted, 
but all the facts involved in this case ~would be applic-
able to the old section, however. The above section is 
only declaratory of the common law as held by Utah 
cases, including the case of Hummel vs. Yo~tng, 265 Pac. 
2d· 410,' ;1 Utah 2d 237, :which shows· that there is one 
qualification to the last· sentence of the above statute 
' 
which. is that the grantor must first own the fee in the 
street· before he can convey it. This case states· that 
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"at common law, a private conveyance of land· bounded 
by or abutting on a highway., the fee to which belongs 
to the abutting o:wner, is presumed to convey the fee to 
the highway and to the center thereof.'' Before the 
plaintiff's predecessor, who owned the abutting prop-
ertly at th~ time Cedar City vacated the street, could 
con.vey any interest in the street, that predecessor must 
have first acquired the fee in the street by deed be-
cause the closing of the. street by ordinance would give 
him nothing. It is also submitted that when the statute 
says that a transfer of land bounded by a highway 
. .. . 
(italics added} it means there must actually be a high-
w~y. It is. submitted that a necessary and indispensable 
ingred.ieD:t of the common law rule and the above sec-
tion of. our code is. that there must be a highway or 
street .. ·and ·if there is none, then the common law rule 
or the above Statute would have absolutely no applica-
tion. . Furthermore, this. statute has nothing to do with 
who owns a street u.pori its vacation as· it says nothing 
about ·this and all it does ·say is that a transfer of 
land bounded by a highway transfers to the center. 
Section 27~1-7 also points up another. important fact 
which is that if there is any doubt that Cedar City only 
obtained, from Kate vVallace an easement, this section 
should dispel any such doubt -.as it affirmatively estab-
lishes that the City only obtained· an easement. In the 
lig4.t: of thi~ statute, even ·'vithout the limiting language 
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in .the: deed of Kate Wallace to Cedar City: in ·1950;-ho:\V 
could the court find that the City received, from Kate 
Wallace full title and ownership in ~the property,? 
But this common law rule or ·the above section of 
our code has absolutely no· application in this case. 
There never was a street, either physically on 'the 
ground or by plat or map, and this is a necessary pre~ 
requisite to the application of this rlile of law. During 
all the times ·involved in this action, the ·''street'' in 
question was actually unimproved property the same 
as the property adjoining. There was nothing to indi-
cate that it was a street and no one used it ·-as such. If 
there was no street, how could any legal rights to th-e 
street property flow to an abutting owner upon the clos-
ing of a non-existent street, or by a conveyance of prop~ 
erty appearing to abut -upon a street? It is admitted 
that the books are 1iterally full of cases which hold that 
upon the closing of a ··street, the street property goes 
to the' abutting owners. ·But upon reading the cases it 
is found that the abutting owner also happened to own 
the fee in the street, and in all cases, ·there actually 
'vas a street, open and in use, or at least existing by 
official.map or plat .. Here there was neither and clear-
ly this doctrine of Jaw would- have no. application . 
. In fact the reasons. for_ this common law rule as 
relied. upon by the_ courts are not even present in this 
case.-_: Som~ of the courts in following this rule do so 
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upon the theory that whenever a conveyance is made 
with reference to a natural monument, be it a stream, 
street, hedge, wall or post, it actually carries to the cen-
ter of the monument. But what if there was no such 
monument¥ However, the reason given for applying 
this rule as followed by a majority of the courts is that 
when a grantor conveys land abutting upon or with 
reference to a street, the grantor actually intends to 
convey all he owns because a narrow strip of land, con-
sisting of half a street, in the event the street is later 
vacated, would be of no use to him and yet would be of 
considerable value to his grantee. Therefore, the grant-
or is presumed to have intended that his deed carry to 
the middle of the street. But we do not have that situ-
ation here. Instead it will be noted that Kate VvT allace, 
who originally owned the whole tract of approximately 
5.9 acres, first conveyed out the property east of the 
''street'' to plaintiff's predecessors. .....~t that time in 
1942, she still 0"\\'1led the ''street'' property and also 
all the remaining property to the west and south. It 
is not a situation of Kate Wallace then only owning 
the fee to the ''street'' so that upon its closing she 
~ould only have a narro'v unusable strip of land, but 
rather she owned a sizable tract adjoining on the. west. 
How ·could it be said that K_ate Wallace actually intend-
ed to convey to plaintiff's predecessors an additional 
2 rods of land which \Vould only haYe the effect of de-
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creasing her larger tract by . that much~- . Therefor~, ,it 
is clear. that the main reason given by the courts for 
applying this rule is not here pres .. ent. 
Furthermore, it should be ·noted that at the. time 
Kate Wallace conveyed the property to plaintiff's pre-
decessors, the west line of which was the ''public road 
as shown on Plat A of said property and adjoining 
property made by Theron Ashcroft, ·then south along 
the east line of said road . . ., '' there actually was no 
Plat A and no road in existence and therefore, this was 
not a situation of conveying property abutting upon . a 
street which is always the situation in the cases adher-
ing to this rule. 
Therefore; it 1s the earnest contention of the de-
fendant that even if the planitiff had r·elied upon this 
doctrine of law to give her the fee to half the street in 
question, it still would not be applicable. Thus, the only 
possible theory upon which the plaintiff could sustain 
a claim into the fee in the street fails. 
POINT IV 
AS TO WHETHER A GRANTOR CONVEYS THE FEE IN 
A STREET BY A CONVEYANCE OF THE STREET OR BY 
A CONVEYANCE OF ABUTTING PROPE.RTY DEPENDS 
UPON THE INTENTION . AND THE SURROUNDING CIR-
CUMSTANCES. 
-The best reason for holding that Kate Wallace 
never intended to part with the f~e in the street prop-
erty or applying the common law rule is that from the 
de~dfJ. and surrounding circumstances, it is clear Kate 
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Wallace intended otherwise. The common law rule is 
only .a rule of presumption and if a co~trary contention 
is shown by the grantor .in her deeds or in the surround-
ing ci~cumstances, that will prevail. Here Kate W al-
lace, who is now deceased, made it abundantly clear 
that she did not intend to part with the fee to the street 
property when she conveyed the property abutting on 
the east. A few years after deeding out the property 
on the east to the plaintiff's predecessors, she then con-
veyed an easement in the street property to Cedar City. 
It is clear that she intended to reserve the fee because 
~he stated in her deed to Cedar City that the property 
was to be used for street and for no other .purpose. This 
evinces an i~tent on her part to hold the fee. Other-
wise, why was not this deed to Cedar City a simple con-
veyance by warranty deed with no strings or conditions 
at~ached ~ Then a year and a half later, in August, 
1951, at which time no street had ever been opened or 
in existence, she executed her deed to the defendant of 
the identical ''street'' property and then following her 
description of the property put in the clause "it is the 
intent of the g-rantor to convey all right, title and inter-
est in the above property heretofore conveyed to Cedar 
City for a street in the event Cedar City vacates said 
street.'' What could be clearer than at that time Kate 
Wallace was intending to convey to the defendant the 
fee in the street? 
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As stated above the eommon law rule is' a rebuttable 
presumption. There· are almosf as many cases rebutting 
this presumption as there are which''follow it. It should 
~ 
be noted that a strict. construction of any deed to ·prop-
erty abutting upon a street would not include any. of 
the street but· instead would only run to the street li:ne. 
In other words it is to a certain extent a fiction and the 
courts are very liberal in finding a contrary intention. 
Perhaps the best case in which the presumption is re-
butted happens to be a Utah case, the leading case of 
Brown vs. Oregon Short Line, supra. This is a very 
interesting case and should be · controlling here. There 
a property owner owned a tract of land where the Union 
Pacific Railroad yards are now located in Salt Lake 
City. He opened up a · short street to serve the prop-
erty and then divided it into building lots, fronting on 
this street and he then commenced selliiJ.g the lots. A 
year or so later, he conveyed to the same grantees, by 
a separate conveyance, an easement in the street. The 
street was open and used for a number ·of years as a 
means of ingress and egress to the lots. Subsequently 
the railroad acquired ·all ihe property abutting on· this 
street for its yards and then claimed the land which· 
had been the street. The necessity for such a street 
ended when the r~ilroad acquired all the abutting prop-
erty. The railroad claimed that since the abutting own· 
ers had owned the fee in the· street by reason of their 
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deeds of property· abutting upon the street, then the 
railroad. acquired the. fee in the street by buying out the 
abutting owners. The Court held otherwise, however, 
stating that the original owner, by conveying to his 
grantees separately an easement in the street a year or 
so after the conveyance of the abutting property, showed 
his intention to retain the fee in the street. This case 
is very similar to the case at bar in that the clear in-
tention of Kate Wallace throughout all of her deeds 
was that the fee in the street had never passed and 
that she owned it all the time. 
Another revealing fact shows the intention of Kate 
Wallace. It should be noted that she first conveyed out 
the property on the east of the street to plaintiff's pre-
decessors and then she conveyed the property on the 
west of the street to defendant's predecessor. This left 
her . _ o"\\rning only a small tract, 66 feet wide and 150 
feet . long, and obviously of building lot size. In fact 
it is iqentical with the plaintiff's lot on the east and 
also with the lot east of the plaintiff. Kate Wallace. 
most certainly intended that the fee in the street would 
remain with her and that if, for any reason, it was not 
used for a street or if used and then vacated, this build-
ing lot would come back to her. 
Forgetting for a moment the law involved in this 
case, let us look at the equities. This case is plainly a 
situation of the pla~ntiff attempting to ''get something 
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for nothing." The -common ·owner; !{ate :wallace,~- had i 
made it abundantly clear that she did not intend:to: di-
vest herself of the fee until she did so to the defendant 
in August of 1951, yet the plaintiff- is attempting~· to 
acquire a six rod lot when· her grantor 'only had a ,four 
rod lot and at the expense of a person who did every--· 
thing she .could do to retain it to herself. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, it is the appellant's contention that 
the plaintiff has completely missed the crux of this case . 
by proceeding on the theory that Ce<;lar City actually 
owned the title to the street property and that this_ 
automatically reverted to and vested in the abutting 
owner upon the vacation of the street. That it has 
never ~een the law that upon the closing of a street, 
the land reverts to the abutting owner simply because 
he is the abutting owner. That the law is that upon 
closing a street, the land goes to the owner of the fee 
in the street and the appellant has made no effort to 
prove that she is the owner of the fee but rather it is 
clear that the appellant is the o·wner and is now entitled 
to full ownership of the property. Even though not 
relied upon by the appellant, the doctrine that the grant-
or intends the grantee of abutting property take to the 
center of the street has no application here because 
there never was a street and even if there were, the 
in1ent ·of- the parties as gathered · f'rom all the various 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
deeds, effectively refutes the common law rule. In any 
event, neither under the common law rule nor under the 
plaintiff's theory can the plaintiff prevail because under 
both theories there must be a street. Since there never 
was a street, we .are actually not concerned with who 
owns a street after the public body vacates it or for 
that matter with the rights of abutting owners. Instead 
we are only concerned with the ownership of adjoining 
building lots, to be determined by the various convey-
ances from the common grantor, and from them it is 
clear that the defendant-appellant is the owner of the 
disputed property. 
Respe·ctfully subm.itted, 
ORVILLE IsoM, 
Attorney for .Appellant. 
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